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Traditionally investigated in philosophy, body ownership and agency—two main
components of the minimal self—have recently gained attention from other disciplines,
such as brain, cognitive and behavioral sciences, and even robotics and artificial
intelligence. In robotics, intuitive human interaction in natural and dynamic environments
becomes more and more important, and requires skills such as self-other distinction and
an understanding of agency effects. In a previous review article, we investigated studies
onmechanisms for the development of motor and cognitive skills in robots (Schillaci et al.,
2016). In this review article, we argue that these mechanisms also build the foundation
for an understanding of an artificial self. In particular, we look at developmental processes
of the minimal self in biological systems, transfer principles of those to the development
of an artificial self, and suggest metrics for agency and body ownership in an artificial self.
Keywords: artificial self, developmental robotics, sense of agency, predictive processes, sense of body ownership,
minimal self
1. INTRODUCTION
People can usually easily recognize their own body and the results of their own actions. This
apparently simple skill likely contributes to what makes us feel as separate entities in the world
(Van Den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002) and it is indeed fundamental for interacting with the
environment and with other individuals. A current research trend suggests that the minimal self
- the pre-reflective experience of being a self, or the awareness of oneself as a subject of experience
(Blanke and Metzinger, 2009)— would be characterized by two important aspects: a sense of body
ownership—I feel corporal sensations as uniquely belonging to my own body—and a sense of agency
- I feel being in control of my own actions (Gallagher, 2000).
Topics such as body ownership and agency that have traditionally been investigated in
philosophy have recently gained attention from other disciplines, such as brain, cognitive and
behavioral sciences, and even robotics and artificial intelligence. Some neuroscientists, for example,
interpret certain human mental disorders—such as schizophrenia—as the result of a disrupted
sense of the self (Frith et al., 2000; Nelson et al., 2014; Klaver and Dijkerman, 2016; Sterzer et al.,
2016). In robotics, intuitive human interaction in natural and dynamic environments becomes
more and more important, and requires skills such as self-other distinction and an understanding
of agency effects (Holthaus and Wachsmuth, 2012; Belpaeme et al., 2018). Developmental
psychologists study the emergence of self-awareness from very early stages of development. Self-
awareness would unfold already during the first months of life, when infants seem to start having
a sense of how their own body is situated in relation to other entities in the environment (Rochat,
2003). Infants at 5months of age, for example, are able to distinguish their own legmovements from
those of another infant, when they are displayed in a mirror (Rochat, 2003). These action-effects
have been studied in infants using different modalities including sound (Paulus et al., 2012).
Hafner et al. Prerequisites for an Artificial Self
These findings represent a valuable source of inspiration
for roboticists, whose aim is to develop autonomous
robots capable of living in and interacting with the human
society. Developmental robotics addresses this challenge by
implementing methods and algorithms for motor and cognitive
development in artificial systems inspired by infant development
(Cangelosi and Schlesinger, 2015). In developmental robotics,
state of the art machine learning techniques are applied to
computational models, creating artificial systems that can
adapt to new situations and learn in an open-ended fashion.
The emergence of the self represents a key step in cognitive
development. Therefore, there is a growing interest in the
developmental robotics community on implementing processes
capable of enabling the experience of the self—with phenomena
such as sense of body ownership and agency—in artificial agents.
On the other side, robots can represent valuable tools
to investigate phenomena of subjective experience typical of
humans. In fact, robots are equipped with sensors and actuators
that can be inspected and controlled during their operations.
What the robot sees and perceives, and its internal states can
be logged and further analyzed which is obviously not possible
in humans. If robots were capable of detecting and recognizing
their own body and movements, their interaction with the
environment and with people would be much more efficient
and natural. However, the questions about which computational
processes are needed to implement a primitive sense of body
ownership and agency in robots, and of how the ontogenetic
process of the individual shapes the development of the self, are
still open.
This manuscript follows-up a previous review paper (Schillaci
et al., 2016), in which we investigated studies on mechanisms
for the development of motor and cognitive skills in robots.
In this review paper, we argue that the same mechanisms also
build the foundation for the development of an artificial self.
In fact, in infants, the self seems to emerge along the motor
and cognitive development of the individual (Lagercrantz and
Changeux, 2009). Implementing similar processes in artificial
systems may provide insights also in the possibility to develop an
artificial self. In this work, we address the role of developmental
processes in the emergence of an artificial self, and we suggest
the concept of self-manifolds in artificial systems and the use of
metrics for establishing the boundaries of an artificial self.
The review paper is structured as follows. First, in section
2, we revisit the concepts addressed in our previous review
(Schillaci et al., 2016) and frame them within the context
of the development of an artificial self. In particular, we
present advances in the study of behavioral and computational
components that allow autonomous motor and cognitive
development in artificial systems. We discuss how these
components can build the foundation for an artificial self. In
order to do so, we ask whether and how the minimal self is
affected during the ontogenetic process of the individual, and
how open-ended learning and social interaction can shape the
development of an artificial self, and then review robotic studies
addressing this question. In section 3, we review studies on
metrics and boundaries of the human self, and propose their use
also for artificial systems. Finally, in section 4, we provide our
conclusions and open challenges in the quest for the development
of an artificial self.
2. BEHAVIORAL AND COMPUTATIONAL
COMPONENTS
In the robotics literature, the study on the artificial minimal
self is young and fragmented. Unfortunately, a study presenting
a comprehensive overview on the robotic investigations on
this topic is missing. Nonetheless, many articles can be found
providing interesting insights on aspects and prerequisites that
can be related to the development of an artificial self. Two recent
papers highlight both aspects of the human minimal self and an
artificial minimal self. Georgie et al. (2019) look at developmental
indices and behavioral measures of the minimal self, and Lanillos
et al. (2019) look into computational models of neurological
disorders related to the minimal self. In particular, they look into
the balance between sensed and predicted sensory effects in ASD
and schizophrenia.
In a previous review paper (Schillaci et al., 2016), we
investigated studies on mechanisms for the development of
motor and cognitive skills in robots. In particular, we identified
three main behavioral and computational components that
can enable autonomous acquisition of motor skills and the
implementation of basic cognitive capabilities: (1) exploration
behaviors; (2) internal body representations; (3) sensorimotor
simulations. In this review, we extend the review provided in
Schillaci et al. (2016) by creating links to the topic of the
development of an artificial self, beside introducing more recent
robotic studies on related topics. We particularly focus on those
ones that propose strategies to scale up with motor and cognitive
development. We extend exploration behaviors with artificial
curiosity and sensorimotor simulations with predictive processes
in order to strengthen the aspects of the development of a
minimal self. All three components are processes or cognitive
skills that run in parallel and independently from each other
and can be seen as building blocks of the minimal self as
discussed later.
2.1. Self-Exploration Behaviors and
Artificial Curiosity
Human fetuses seem to already have some limited control
on their body, as they react to touch, sound, smell, and
pain, and even show facial expressions responding to external
stimuli (Lowery et al., 2007). Some researchers (Lagercrantz
and Changeux, 2009), though, believe that these reactions may
have subcortical non-conscious origin and that, only shortly
after birth, newborns show signs of basic self-awareness. In fact,
developmental studies provide evidence about infant behaviors
displaying some level of self-awareness in their first weeks of life
(Rochat, 2011). Nonetheless, whether—and to what extend—self-
awareness is present at birth, developmental researchers believe
that it would unfold during early stages of development [see
Rochat (2003) for empirical evidence and proposals]. However,
why and how self-awareness exactly would emerge during
infancy are still open questions and in particular there are no
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thorough theories or computational models explaining their
function. Hart and Scassellati (2011) argue that self-identification
algorithms are the first step toward a more comprehensive model
of the robotic self.
There is a general consensus on recognizing the important
role in the development of self-awareness to the perceptual
experiences that toddlers undergo when exploring and playing
with their surroundings. The self would emerge through the
active interaction with one’s physical and social environment
(Verschoor and Hommel, 2017). Indeed, exploration behaviors
are recognized as the means for motor and cognitive
development in infants, as well as in robots [see Schillaci
et al. (2016) for a review]. Several studies investigate the
cognitive mechanisms and drives behind exploration and play in
infancy. In infants, curiosity—which is usually inferred through
their use of prolonged visual attention to stimuli (Benson and
Haith, 2010. p. 157–167; Grgicˇ et al., 2016) is thought to drive
the emergence of ordered developmental trajectories, including
in domains such as vocal development, imitation and tool use
discovery (Acevedo-Valle et al., 2018; Oudeyer, 2018). This is
contrary to earlier belief that infants learn by random actions,
but rather that their actions are goal-directed from the very start
(Von Hofsten, 2004).
Infants’ curiosity, play and exploration—and the likely goal-
directed nature of their actions—have attracted the interest
of developmental roboticists. In fact, studies on artificial
curiosity have demonstrated how mechanisms for goal-directed
exploration can be used to efficiently learn robot dynamics,
even if the artificial system is characterized by complex high-
dimensional embodiments. Artificial curiosity goes beyond
novelty detection that would drive the agent to novel, but not
necessarily predictable regions of its sensorimotor space. In
contrast, artificial curiosity drives the agent toward regions where
the learning progress can be maximized (Oudeyer et al., 2007).
The main difference to typical machine learning scenarios is
that the agent creates its own training samples for a desired
learning trajectory.
The first studies on artificial curiosity and exploration
in robots were limited, in a way. Although promising and
demonstrating that curiosity-driven and exploration behaviors
can efficiently solve inverse and forward kinematics problems,
they mostly focused on relatively simple tasks, such as reaching
actions for robot manipulators. Prolonged and incremental
learning, until recently, was not a main priority in these
studies. Indeed, it is still a great challenge in the whole
robotics community. Seemingly, assuming that, in infants, self-
awareness is a result of complex and prolonged interactions and
experiences, the study on the development of an artificial self
has to address, as well, how self-awareness would unfold along
incremental learning in robots.
Recently, interesting studies have been published on topics
close to this line of thoughts. For instance, studies in the literature
on goal-directed exploration in artificial systems proposed ways
to scale up learning to multiple task spaces (Forestier and
Oudeyer, 2016; Forestier et al., 2017) or to domains where
exploration of a task space requires action planning in multiple
steps (Loviken and Hemion, 2017; Loviken et al., 2018). Figure 1
shows the results of a curiosity-based learning method for
humanoid robots, where the sensory space was partitioned into
a disjoint set of finite elements. In this space, every element was
seen as an independent goal-babbling problem and a planning
module could be added by observing transitions between the
different elements (Loviken and Hemion, 2017; Loviken et al.,
2018).
Acevedo-Valle et al. (2018) studied intrinsic motivation
systems in the context of early vocal development which
further develop through social reinforcement. An artificial
agent was endowed with a proprioceptive mechanism, which
was used to prevent the execution of unreachable motor
configurations or invalid (painful) configurations. Moreover,
the authors introduced an expert instructor which produced
correct utterances whenever the exploring autonomous learner
was emitting similar (although still not correct) sounds.
This resulted in a social reinforcement, which provided
FIGURE 1 | Curiosity-based learning method for humanoid robots using postures and regions. This image shows an example of postures learned after 30 min of
online learning (Loviken et al., 2018). (A,B) Represent two independent runs, and the number indicate the state. Each state is responsible for an interval of angle φ,
where φ is the torso’s orientation in relation to the ground. A demonstration video can be found at this URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QzZsJxyGGIk.
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clues to the learner of interesting sensorimotor regions
to explore.
Interesting advances have been made also in the context of
goal generation. For instance, Mannella et al. (2018) show how an
artificial system can autonomously generate goals to be used in an
intrinsic motivation system to explore and to gather knowledge
about its own body. In Schillaci et al. (2020), the authors present
an architecture for curiosity-driven goal-directed exploration
behaviors on a camera-equipped robot arm. A combination
of deep neural networks for offline unsupervised learning of
low-dimensional features from images, and of online learning
of shallow neural networks was used. The artificial curiosity
system assigned interest values to a set of pre-defined goals,
and drove the exploration toward those that were expected to
maximize the learning progress. Moreover, the authors proposed
the integration of an episodicmemory system to face catastrophic
forgetting issues, typically experienced when performing online
updates of artificial neural networks. The results showed that
adopting an episodic memory system not only prevented the
computational models from quickly forgetting knowledge that
have been previously acquired, but also provided new avenues
for modulating the balance between plasticity and stability of
the models.
In humans, the self develops along the ontogenetic process
of the individual. This is closely related to mechanisms of
open-ended learning and social interaction, but also on the
establishment and refinement of plastic body representations.
The next section will provide an overview of recent studies on
body representations in artificial systems.
2.2. Body Representations
Many researchers have suggested theories in trying to explain the
experience of body ownership and agency, and self-awareness in
general. Sense of agency and sense of body ownership seem to
be strongly linked, but many empirical studies still investigate
them separately from each other. The appearance of the first
signs of self-awareness in newborns seems to be dependent to the
establishment of thalamocortical connections (Lagercrantz and
Changeux, 2009). In general, the sense of body ownership seems
to be strongly intertwined with an internal representation of the
body maintained by our brain. Here we adopt the conceptual
clarification by Gallagher (1986) between body image and body
schema, where body image is a conscious representation or
image of the body, whereas body schema is a non-conscious
representation of sensorimotor skills. While we interact with the
environment, we generate a rich set of multi-modal sensory and
motor experience (Schillaci et al., 2016). This information has
been proposed to be integrated in a sort of a body schema into
our brain, which would keep an up-to-date representation of the
positions and configurations of the different body parts in space
(Maravita et al., 2003; Hoffmann et al., 2010). Moreover, the body
schema very likely undergoes a continuous process of adaptation,
as humans and animals follow an ontogenetic process where
corporal dimensions and morphology change over time. The
way in which we represent and feel our body seems to strongly
rely on these representations, which would integrate inputs from
different sensory modalities (Azañón et al., 2016). Scientists
carried out experiments to explore how the brain combines
information from the flow of sensory input data to create a feeling
of body ownership, such as the famous experiment of the rubber
hand illusion, where the participant is confused by the sight of a
fake hand and synchronized sensory stimulation (Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998).
Some researchers in cognitive development link the
construction of the self to the experience encoded in a sort
of autobiographical memory (Nelson, 2003). Pointeau and
Dominey (2017) review a range of robotic experiments that
address different aspects of the self and relate them to the
definition of the self as given by Neisser (1995). Ulric Neisser
proposed five types of self-knowledge that correspond to
five distinct components of the self: ecological, interpersonal,
conceptual, temporally extended, and private. The ecological self,
that is “the individual situated in and acting upon the immediate
physical environment” (Neisser, 1995), is perhaps the level which
is most interesting here, and it is rather easy, given the current
robot technologies, to design robotic experiments addressing it.
Ecological proprioception is integrated with different modalities
of sensory information concerning one’s own body as interacting
within the environment (Gallagher, 2007). The tactile modality
has received particular interest from researchers on subjective
experiences, and on their impairments in patients with brain
disorders. Van Stralen et al. (2011), for instance, studied how
self-touch influences the structural representation of one’s own
body and found that self-touch may be modulating impairments
in body ownership.
Developmental roboticists have also focused their attention
onto the role of the tactile modality in the formation and
maintenance of body representations. For instance, Zenha et al.
(2018) studied how a body schema can be adapted incrementally
in a humanoid robot based on touch events. Hoffmann (2017)
studied the role of self-touch experiences in the formation of
a self. Self-touch would provide redundant information that
would facilitate the formation of a body representation. Timing
and synchrony has been identified also as an important feature
in support to the integration of information from multiple
modalities within a body representations. Nabeshima et al. (2005)
present a robotic study in support of that.
Hoffmann et al. (2018) studied a self-organizing model for
body representation on an iCub humanoid robot with an artificial
pressure-sensitive skin. In particular, the proposed framework
was used to learn a topographic representation of the robot’s body
surface from experience, that is by receiving tactile stimulations
all over its artificial skin, including multi-touch stimulations.
2.3. Sensorimotor Simulations and
Predictive Processes
A growing number of scientists now consider the brain as
an active organ of inference (De Ridder et al., 2013; Picard
and Friston, 2014; Kirchhoff, 2018). Self-awareness and self
recognition are thought to be dependent also on predictive
processes - or sensorimotor simulations—implemented by the
brain (Hohwy, 2013; Apps and Tsakiris, 2014; Friston, 2018).
Predictive processes may have several functions, but one
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important is that of sensory attenuation. Pyasik et al. (2019)
showed that felt ownership of a fake hand in the rubber hand
illusion experiment caused attenuation of somatosensory stimuli
generated by its movements comparable to the attenuation of
self-generated stimuli. Burin et al. (2018) also investigated the
influence of timing on the effect of agency.
Similar computational models can be implemented into
robots to provide themwith predictive capabilities. Sensorimotor
predictions and prediction errors can be recorded and analyzed,
as well. In humans – in contrast – such properties cannot directly
be observed and controlled. Bechtle et al. (2016) and Lang et al.
(2018) implemented internal models into a humanoid robot to
study how body representations can emerge from sensorimotor
experience, and how predictive processes can be run through
these computational tools. They found that prediction errors can
serve as a cue to distinguish between self-generated perceptual
events and those generated by other subjects. Moreover, they
showed how predictive processes can be used to attenuate
self-body perception (see Figure 2). Lang et al. (2018) adopted
a convolutional neural network for implementing a forward
model, which generates image predictions from low-dimensional
proprioceptive and motor states (see Figure 3).
Pico et al. (2016) demonstrated that a two-wheeled mobile
robot was capable of detecting unexpected changes in the
environment and able to classify motor behaviors by comparing
the ego-noise generated by its motors with the ego-noise
prediction of its internal model. In a first experiment, several ego-
noise prediction models have been trained, each of them with
a different motor command pattern. All models were then fed
with a particular motor sequence, obtaining a series of ego-noise
predictions. The robot was able to determine the correct motor
command pattern by selecting the model with the lowest ego-
noise prediction error. In a second experiment, one ego-noise
forward model has been trained by implementing randommotor
babbling on the robot in a flat arena. The model was tested by
making the robot do a series of runs from side to side of the arena
FIGURE 2 | Self-body attenuation through predictive processes (Lang et al., 2018). A humanoid robot Nao is moving its arm in front of an object. The first row shows
the frames recorded from its camera. The second row shows the enhanced frames, where self-body perception is attenuated. The attenuation is aided by a forward
model, which anticipates the pixels where the robot arm will be visualized, after executing an intended motor command.
FIGURE 3 | An illustration of the forward model adopted in Lang et al. (2018) for generating image predictions from low-dimensional proprioceptive and motor states
through a convolutional neural network. Legend: S(t): sensory state at time t. M(t): Motor command sent at time t. D: Dense, i.e., fully connected, neural network layer.
C: Convolutional neural network layer. TC: Transposed Convolutional neural network layer. Every layer except the last (output) one is followed by a ReLU activation unit
(not shown) (Lang et al., 2018).
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while calculating ego-noise predictions. A ramp was then added
in the middle and the runs were repeated. A comparison between
the ego-noise prediction errors generated in the flat arena and
those of the arena with the ramp on the middle, showed that
the ego-noise prediction error increased when the robot was over
the ramp. This demonstrated that the robot was able to detect
changes in the inclination of the surface it moves only by making
ego-noise predictions.
Predictive models can also be used for robot imitation.
Pico et al. (2017) utilized robot ego-noise as a mean
for communicating intended actions among robots. In an
experiment, a robot generated a series of ego-noise audio
(emulated by a loudspeaker) representing an intended motor
command sequence and conveyed it to another robot. The
receiver robot obtained auditory features from the ego-noise
through a convolutional autoencoder. These audio features
were then fed into an inverse model in order to obtain
motor command predictions, which were similar to the
motor commands that generated the audio produced by the
sender robot.
Winfield (2018) describes a range of different experiments
with artificial agents running internal simulations of themselves,
others, and the environment, and compares these skills to an
artificial Theory of Mind. “Theory of mind is the term given
by philosophers and psychologists for the ability to form a
predictive model of self and others” Winfield (2018). These
internal simulations show how to increase robot safety (Blum
et al., 2018) by anticipating self and other behavior (Winfield and
Hafner, 2018).
Predictive processes have also been studied by Hinz et al.
(2018) in the context of the rubber hand illusion. The authors
analyzed the drift in the perception of the real limb toward the
fake limb, which would suggest an update of body estimation
resulting from stimulation. In particular, they compared body
limb drifting patterns of human participants with the end-
effector estimation displacement of a multisensory robotic arm
enabled with predictive processing perception. They observed
similar drifting patterns in both human and robot experiments,
suggesting that the perceptual drift is due to prediction error
fusion, rather than hypothesis selection.
Touch seems to be a more direct sense, which could
be trusted more for prediction than distant senses such as
vision. It also equally concerns sense of agency and sense of
body ownership. Ciaunica (2019) emphasizes the developmental
aspects of touch, self-touch and intersubjective touch. An
interesting aspect of predicting the sensory consequences of
touch is the feeling of ticklishness, that has been addressed
by Sarah Blakemore in a paper with the title “Why can’t you
tickle yourself ” (Blakemore et al., 2000). This phenomenon of
ticklishness has also been shown in mice recently (Ishiyama and
Brecht, 2016). In a preliminary study on touch prediction in
artificial systems, Stiehler and Hafner (2017) could show how a
predictive model learns to predict the sensory consequences of
touch. The sensory consequences of self-touch are usually more
predictable than those of being touched by someone else. The
sensation of ticklishness might be triggered by specific changes
in prediction error over time, but there is little work so far
on this topic. Quantitative studies showed that self-generated
forces are perceived in the tactile modality as weaker than
externally generated forces of the same magnitude, suggesting
again that sensory consequences of a movement are anticipated
and attenuated (Shergill et al., 2003).
Vicente et al. (2016) showed how predictive process can also
support adaptation of body schemas. The authors combined
predictions made by a learned internal model with the
actual visual feedback to improve the perceptual skill of a
humanoid robot.
The aforementioned studies suggest that predictive
processes—as simulations of sensorimotor activities—are
important tools for implementing basic cognitive capabilities in
artificial systems, and may represent necessary building blocks
for providing robots with subjective experiences, such as those
typical of the minimal self.
3. METRICS FOR AN ARTIFICIAL SELF
As mentioned before, the minimal self is often described by
two major building blocks: a sense of body ownership and
a sense of agency. Both are subjective measures (articulated
by the word “sense”), and can vary between individuals, over
time, and depending on the situation. As has been shown in
various experiments, for example in the rubber hand illusion
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), and in virtual reality studies
(Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Banakou et al., 2018), both the
sense of body ownership and the sense of agency can be altered
in humans. This points toward a certain plasticity of the brain’s
body representation. Predictive capabilities play a major role in
maintaining a consistent minimal self. Based on our self-models,
we as humans anticipate the effects of our own actions and
can thus monitor them. Longo et al. (2008) for example take
a psychometric approach to the question of embodiment and
sense of agency based on introspective reports of the rubber
hand illusion.
In artificial agents, a similar measure for a sense of body
ownership and a sense of agencymight be identified. As discussed
in the previous sections, most models related to agency and
ownership rely on forward models and internal simulations, and
have permanent access to a prediction error. When such a model
is embodied in an artificial agent, the agent has also direct access
to this measure. Michel et al. (2004), for instance, showed in a
robotics study that extensions of the self in the visual field can
be identified by learning the time delay between actions and
their effects.
What could be the necessary requirements of measuring self-
ness in artificial agents? In analogy to prediction and anticipation
in the human minimal self, a sense of agency and a sense of
body ownership should be linked to changes in the prediction
error in artificial agents over time as well. Preliminarily ignoring
the complex dynamics of the prediction error, we could say
that the lower the error in the prediction of the consequences
of self-generated actions, the stronger a sense of agency and
body ownership.
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Given the considerations taken above, we can characterize
a self-manifold in sensorimotor space with the following
properties: It is dynamic, as it can change with body growth
and the acquisition of new skills; it is adaptive, where the error
tolerance can vary according to the specific context and the states
of the system and of the surrounding environment.
The self-manifold outlines the boundaries of the self, both
related to body ownership and agency, which cannot be
clearly separated. A concrete example of learning manifolds in
sensorimotor space, however not related to the concept of self,
can be found in Laflaquière et al. (2015). The boundaries of
the self related to body ownership are closely related to notions
of peripersonal space (PPS) (Clery and Hamed, 2018). The
same can hold for agency if we consider multisensory channels
including tactile information and assume temporal and cross-
modal predictions (Clery and Hamed, 2018).
Prediction errors—such as those produced by forward
models—may be used for determining the boundaries of the self-
manifold in the sensorimotor space of artificial agents. Hereby,
we encourage further robotics investigation within this research
line, as it may provide insights in the understanding of the human
self and in the implementation of the artificial self.
This idea follows the argument of Gallese and Sinigaglia
(2010) who envision the bodily self as a manifold of action
possibilities that cannot be reduced to any form of proprioceptive
awareness. Action possibilities necessarily require a system that is
able to make predictions about the consequences of own actions.
Actions not only include physical bodymovements and change of
postures, but also interaction with the external world, including
interaction with objects but also other agents (see Neisser, 1995’s
notion of interpersonal self).
For simplification, we only consider prediction errors caused
by actions affecting the peripersonal space of the agent. A self-
metric for an artificial agent is a systematic way to assign a value
to each suitable instance of an agent self. It should allow us to
compare the self-ness of one agent at a certain instant in time to
the self-ness of another agent or the same agent at another instant
in time.
Nonetheless, there are still open issues that need to be solved
for deciding on such a metric: what timing issues arise; what
are the modalities to include or exclude; and which are suitable
computational models for multimodal integration. Such a metric
will also allow to decide the balance of predicted information
vs. perceived information and might ultimately shed light on
mechanisms of disturbances of the self in humans.
Similarities to the concept of the self-manifold can be
found with that of the markov blanket (Kirchhoff et al.,
2018). Organisms tend to self-organize within a coherent
whole, maintaining a boundary that separates their internal
states from the external world. A markov blanket has been
theoretised as defining the boundaries of such systems in a
statistical sense. If taking the theoretical standpoint of the Free
Energy Principle, as proposed by Friston (2013) , this would
mean that organisms maintain their integrity by minimizing
variational free energy (surprise) over their internal states. That
is, they maximize evidence for their own models, i.e., their
own existence (Kirchhoff et al., 2018). In predictive coding,
free energy is associated with prediction errors. The free-
energy bound, or markov blanket, can be associated with
a prediction error boundary. A self-manifold may thus be
formalized as a markov blanket around the sensorimotor states
of an agent.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this manuscript, we studied the literature on developmental
processes for an artificial self. We reviewed a number of works
addressing the self in artificial systems and suggesting basic
behavioral and computational components that may serve for
the implementation of subjective experiences in robots. However,
many questions and challenges in the development of an artificial
self still remain open.
In section 2, we reviewed the behavioral and computational
components necessary to develop an artificial self - inspired by
models of the human self - in the three areas “Self-exploration
behaviors and artificial curiosity,” “Body representations,” and
“Sensorimotor simulations and predictive processes.” These
ingredients of an artificial self have been studied extensively
in robotics and computational modeling, and will need to
be integrated for a full understanding of the self using
computational methods.
A common trend in both analytic sciences such as psychology
and neuroscience and synthetic sciences such as robotics is to
look more into the developmental processes that shape the self.
This allows us to identify prerequisites and test existing theories
of the self.
In section 3, we pointed out that beside the challenging task
of implementing such mechanisms in artificial systems, there is
a need for defining and designing metrics for an artificial self.
We suggested requirements for such a self-metric and identified
properties of a self-manifold as being adaptive and dynamic.
Although we are far from establishing whether artificial agents
can ever undergo subjective experiences, these metrics may
provide support and insights in the investigation of the self, in
both robots and humans.
To conclude this review, we suggest a number of open
challenges of the artificial self. In particular, there is a need
of integrating the three main behavioral and computational
components mentioned above: Self-exploration behaviors and
artificial curiosity, body representations, and sensorimotor
simulations and predictive processes.
Moreover, further investigation is required in addressing the
following overall challenges: designing models for multimodal
integration in lifelong learning robotics setups; working
on a refinement of self-metrics; identifying difference and
complementarity between agency and body ownership; realizing
the integration of temporal and intentional binding effects within
predictive computational models; and resolving synchronization
as well as conceptual issues.
In robotics, we can access internal states and inspect
sensorimotor and prediction information. However, to what
extent can this privileged point of view allow us to state—if
ever possible—that a robot is undergoing subjective experience?
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Indeed, there is a need for further debating the possibility of
phenomenological experience in artificial systems.
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